2023 July 4

Daily news wrap-up

Army reforms & retraining || Problems during the 2020 war || Friendly fire || Counteroffensive || Arms balance || Interviews with Vova Vartanov and Leonid Nersisyan
by ar_david_hh

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interview with Vova Vartanov, the founder of VOMA military training camp

The interview was taken a month ago after the Armenian army reportedly put up strong resistance and prevented Azeri encroachments in the Gegharkunik/Syunik direction. The observers called it the "first time since the war" that the army performed very well.

REPORTER: Surprisingly, the MOD has become a lot more active on the informational front. They are updating us every 15 minutes. What is Azerbaijan's goal?

VOVA: Azeris want to reach the banks of Lake Sevan to secure more long-term plans.

REPORTER: Can they accomplish that?

VOVA: In 2020 they could for sure, in 2021 it turns out they could, but it appears not anymore as of 2023. The Armenian army, despite its slow reforms, has managed to impress me. It is awakening from a deep sleep.

Our military responded adequately in this direction. Did you know that people serving there are the mob [mobillized forces]? It's about those 25-day retraining summons.

In the past, we would gather the mob in one place for a lengthy "training" period of >3 months. They would play cards and get drunk all day. The result was wholly unprepared men who slightly knew each other. They were sent to the frontline in that condition.

Not anymore. They are properly exercising now. We have witnessed it. They exercise and learn about each other. They also learn about their commanders and actually treat them as commanders and not as their "bros". It's starting to look like a real training process.

I've always supported frequent but short retraining summons. That's what they are doing today. You can give them the bare minimum training in just 7-8 days [with the rest of the month spent in the frontline], and that's sufficient, but only as long as it's done every year.

The problem is, at this pace, how long will it take to retrain every one of the 250,000 reservists? If you don't want to wait decades, you'll need to increase the spending. We need to retrain more than the 3,000-10,000 every year, more like 50,000 a year.

REPORTER: Tell us about the 2016 war [in Artsakh's northeast and southeast].

VOVA: Azeris captured Lalalayka, also known as Lele Tepe [southeast], in April 2016. Why did they refuse to advance after capturing the height? The same about the heights above village Talish [northeast]. They captured the Talish heights, then pretended to capture the village itself. Azeri special forces entered Talish as distraction and left the village without losses. They sustained casualties in nearby gardens by pure coincidence because a shot fired at a building missed the structure, flew over it, and struck the Azeri special forces. About a dozen Yashmas were neutralized there. But their mission was the heights near Talish, and not Talish itself. They successfully used those heights as trampolines in 2020 to push us back.

REPORTER: Is the state paying attention to the importance of private military camps like VOMA?

VOVA: Only the blind didn't notice that structures like VOMA were the ones that completed their mission with the least number of casualties. The so-called "professional" military figures did not want to accept the reality but they have been forced to cooperate with us. They are using some of our capacities. We've been supplying them with snipers for years. A month before the 2020 war, we gave "drone operator" diplomas to 9 of our graduates but they were all ignored by the army.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0ahJHp53IA

interview with military expert Leonid Nersisyan

REPORTER: What did the Armenian and Azeri armies possess as of September 2020?

LEONID: The disbalance is often exaggerated. In some categories like artillery and tanks, Azerbaijan had slightly more quantities and more modern models, but the quantities weren't that big.

Armenia had 300 artillery units. That's multiple times greater than what France and Germany have today.

We had around 300 tanks, which is a very big number for a country size of Armenia. Azeris had 500.

The biggest difference was in the quality of technology. They had modern communication, new anti-tank missiles, and various modern drones. Armenia could have purchased some quantities of these weapons to maintain the balance.

REPORTER: Armenia began to purchase good weapons after the 2016 war. Did we not have time to close the gap?

LEONID: It was mostly heavy equipment like Smerch, Iskander, and very few air defense systems like TOR M2KM which performed quite well (we had 6 TOR units during the war). It was insufficient. But we were missing the technology that connects and integrated them all. Russia isn't the country where you could find such technology.

REPORTER: Turkish and Israeli experts were reportedly in Azerbaijan, helping them operate Bayraktar and Israeli drones. What do you know about this?

LEONID: Bayraktars were delivered 1-2 months before the war so it's very plausible that the Turkish instructors were in Azerbaijan during the war. It is a fact that ranking Turkish officers were present in Azerbaijan and remain there to this day. For example, Turkish army general Bakhtiyar Ersay who led their ground forces is practically the CoGS of the Azeri army today. He is officially an "adviser".

At the very least, 80 Turkish officers worked on behalf of Azerbaijan in 2020. Some serious sources put that number closer to 1,000.

REPORTER: The Armenian army was, in fact, successfully defending during the first week. I witnessed it in person. But at a certain point, the opponent had a breakthrough and our army began the neverending retreat. Why?

LEONID: Armenia was unable to deliver the reservists quickly and effectively because the enemy had air superiority. We were using outdated movement techniques to move large columns of vehicles and personnel. We sustained heavy losses because of this. As a result, our forces on the southern front wore out after 7-10 days of nonstop fighting.

REPORTER: So it was because our soldiers didn't have substitutes, equipment replenishments, and reinforcements?

LEONID: Yes.

REPORTER: We also know that those who were pulled back from the front and given time to rest were returned to the front too quickly.

Why weren't the reserves sent in time?

LEONID: One of the top-5 mistakes was not sending the reserves *before* the war. We didn't send reserves 2-3 days before the launch of the war to bring Artsakh's 18,000 forces into 40,000 with the help of Armenia. *[Context: Sometime before the war, the Armenian army command believed that the risk of a large-scale war was only 30%. Russian army command had given reassurances to Armenia that a major war was unlikely and urged Armenia not to take military steps that would be viewed as a provocation by Azerbaijan. The exact date when these assessments were made is unclear.]*

• Leonid continues:* The war started with a 3-to-1 balance on the ground. Our logistics to restore the balance subsequently failed because of the enemy's air superiority.

REPORTER: Our air defense was almost completely destroyed during the first week. Only one of the TOR units, with a couple of missiles, survived by mid-October. Why weren't there deliveries during the war?

LEONID: We did purchase 4 units of TOR *during* the war but they were irrelevant by the time they were delivered, and besides that they were in poor condition. But when you are a small country with limited quantities, each one of your TOR units becomes a "golden egg". The loss of a single unit has a significant negative impact on the capabilities of the entire army.

In a war that lasts only 44 days, you need a strategic partner who *truly* wants to support you, and who will agree to deliver rapidly. In the case of Ukraine, it took several months for NATO to supply serious weapons. Our war didn't even last that long. Our army didn't have a plan for a war that would last 2 months, we didn't have a lot of ammo. *[So the war was too long for the existing supplies but too short for importing significant quantities of new weapons from abroad.]*

The first 2-3 weeks of our war was more intense than the Ukraine-Russia war. We saw a very high density of artillery barrage. We didn't have enough supplies for this level of intensity for that long.

REPORTER: Why didn't Armenia use its BUK and S-300 units during the crucial first days?

LEONID: We didn't own a BUK. They displayed it in the colors of the Armenian flag during a military parade, but it wasn't Armenian *[паказушка]*. The Russian military base in Armenia owned a division of BUK in an awful shape. Even if they gave it to us, we probably couldn't even use it during the war.

REPORTER: What happened to Iskander?

LEONID: I don't know. We should have struck the Azeri airbases. Bayraktar needed a runway to fly.

REPORTER: Artsakh Defense Army had a list of targets in the event of a war. Airbases and bridges were the top priority.

LEONID: We wouldn't have enough missiles for all those targets. They had to prioritize certain things.

REPORTER: I asked the army which of those objects were destroyed during the war, and they couldn't name a single one.

LEONID: They struck a military facility in Tartar but I'm not sure if there were Azeri soldiers inside. It was very close to the border.

REPORTER: You wrote that we lost 4 SU jets. How did it unfold?

LEONID: 2 of them were shot near Vardenis [Armenia]. It was friendly fire by our S-125 air defense. Another one was shot by Igla in Artsakh, also by friendly fire. The 4th loss was a tragic accident when the jet hit a mountain.

REPORTER: I've been told that we also shot down one of our helicopters.

LEONID: Correct, also with Igla. We have no evidence that Azeris shut down any Armenian jet during the war. Only recently we learned about evidence that Azeris had downed one of our helicopters during the war. We didn't use a lot of aviation, to begin with, and they weren't flying close to the frontline.

REPORTER: Was it possible to stop the enemy's advancement somewhere?

LEONID: We should have retreated from Jabrayil plain [southeast] quickly, without expending our resources for a lengthy period.

We should have had reserve routes on the slopes of Hadrut mountains. Our artillery could have effectively worked against the enemy from behind the hills full of forests. They could have targeted the enemy that was moving from Jabrayil. The forests would have helped our artillery against Azeri air.

REPORTER: Why didn't we do it?

LEONID: We didn't use our strength: fighting in the mountains. Instead, we fought the war in a terrain beneficial to Azerbaijan. The enemy was able to use every type of weapon under its possession: tanks, drones, etc. In comparison, the enemy tried the same tactic in the north but failed because of the terrain.

We exhausted our forces by attempting to defend Jabrayil. Maybe the commanders didn't have the concept of intentionally yielding territories. Our forces should have been located on the mountain slopes after the first week, obviously while dealing blows to the enemy while retreating.

REPORTER: When I returned from Karakhanbeyli [Fizuli, southeast] on September 28th, I met one of the generals and advised him to pull back our positions to the Hadrut area known as "9th kilometer". They thought I was insane. We should have retreated to favorable positions. It would have allowed us to counterattack more easily in the future. But the wheel of confusion and panic became unstoppable.

The failed counteroffensive in Jabrayil broke the spine of our army. That was the turning point. By the time the retreating forces reached their bases, they were destroyed and afraid. Why did they decide to launch the operation?

LEONID: The answer is actually simple. If you look at the map and use old-school methods by drawing arrows on the map, there is actually logic in the operation... if the enemy didn't have air superiority. Our troops were advancing while being exposed to enemy helicopters equipped with Israeli missiles, and drones. Our forces were destroyed within a few hours.

REPORTER: How could the military leadership not properly understand the vulnerabilities?

LEONID: I'm not them, so I don't know. What I know is it was a mistake. Was it intentional or were they just ignorant? They didn't want to retreat from Jabrayil to favorable positions because of their "not one inch" mentality. This is against military logic, which dictates that you must retreat whenever necessary. Ukraine survived the first wave and won the first phase because it allowed Russians to advance hundreds of kilometers. Had they tried to protect their borders, nothing would be left of them by now.

We should have retreated, caused the enemy to sustain losses, and developed the right conditions for a counteroffensive. Also, why didn't we attack in Kelbajar [north] direction while we had the chance? The command wasn't flexible.

REPORTER: Why weren't they?

LEONID: That's how the commanders were.

REPORTER: Are there reforms in the army today?

LEONID: Yes, but slow. The new commanders are younger. Many Corps commanders are Colonels. They are replacing the older generation who did not perform well in 2020. Not performing well is an understatement. They didn't even successfully organized a single major operation. Sure, the 2nd Corps liberated heights in Kelbajar, but it was episodic. So it's good that young and more flexible commanders are being promoted today.

There is also a positive trend in our military industry.

REPORTER: What about the reforms officially declared by MOD?

LEONID: Those are good reforms but we also need deeper and larger structural reforms, a change in principles. It's great that they are working on Territorial Defense Forces. They should intensify these efforts.

We need to make it very expensive for Azerbaijan to attack us. Azeris paid a high price in 2020. The performance of our army during these latest clashes in Sotk displayed the positive changes in our army, but these were small clashes. That was a good start, though. Step 1: Don't get defeated during small clashes.

REPORTER: How many soldiers did Azeris lose in 2020?

LEONID: A respectable Azeri analyst based in Russia, obviously pro-Azeri, believes that they lost 8,000 soldiers. This is a very high number that would indicate that Azeris themselves weren't prepared for a big war. This could also explain why they agreed to sign the Nov. 9 ceasefire document. They could have closed the topic by maintaining the offense if everything was good on their side.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmnx4lssiGU

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Link to original report and comments: