Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Proposals

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Since the first Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994, a number of proposals been discussed for a peaceful end to the conflict, which vary quite a bit from each other.

1997 Package settlement

This is the text of the agreement as it was in July 1997: Minsk Group Nagorno-Karabakh Proposal, July 1997

1997 Phased settlement

The plan, accepted by Ter-Petrosyan and Azerbaijan's leader Heydar Aliyev, called for a "phased" settlement of the conflict which would postpone an agreement on Karabakh's status, the main stumbling block. The "phased" approach envisioned the return of most of the 7 Azerbaijani districts around Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for the deployment of OSCE peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts in the first and second phases, followed by the lifting of the Azerbaijani and Turkish blockades of Armenia in the third stage, and leaving for last the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh's status, the Lachin Corridor, and the return of displaced persons.[1]

This is the text of the phased agreement as it was in December 1997: Minsk Group Nagorno-Karabakh Proposal, December 1997

[Important note: This plan was not well received in Armenia, and led to Ter-Petroyan's semi-forced resignation in February 1998. Robert Kocharyan, originally from Nagorno-Karabakh took over as president and removed Nagorno-Karabakh representatives from the negotiating table.]

More info on both the package and phased settlements, and the diplomacy behind it, and the rejection in US documents declassified 25 years after the fact (in Armenian): https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32250473.html

Text of 1997 Phased Settlement

1998 Common State Proposal

This proposal by Russia's FM Primakov proposed a relationship of equals between Stepanakert and Baku, in one country. Azerbaijan immediately rejected it.

This is the text of the agreement as it was in November 1998: Minsk Group Nagorno-Karabakh Proposal, November 1998

1999 Key West proposal

Negotiated between Armenia's new president Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev, this plan is said to have involved some kind of link or land swap through Armenia's Meghri region, which would connect Azerbaijan proper with Nakhichevan (and by extension, Turkey).

Both presidents agreed to the plan while at Key West, but Aliyev backed out after returning to Baku and seeing it was not well received.

[Important note: The Meghri region is what connects Armenia to Iran, without it, Armenia has no border with Iran any longer. For Azerbaijan, gaining the Meghri region would mean not only finally connecting Azerbaijan proper to their Nakhichevan exclave, it would also via Nakhichevan connect them directly to Turkey.]

2009 Madrid principles

While not an actual peace proposal, these principles were proposed by the co-chair countries of the Minsk group in 2009 in order to guide the negotiations going forward.


In July 2009, within the framework of the G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy, the three leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, Medvedev, Obama, and Sarkozy, released a statement urging the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, to "resolve the few differences remaining between them and finalize their arrangement on these Basic Principles".[2]

According to that statement, the Basic Principles for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are based on the Helsinki Final Act (1975) principles of Non-Use of Force, Territorial Integrity, and the Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples.[2]

The above-mentioned document also revealed six key elements for the settlement:

  1. return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;
  2. an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;
  3. a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;
  4. future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;
  5. the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and
  6. international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

At the same time the OSCE Co-Chairs urged the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the few differences remaining between them and finalize their agreement on these Basic Principles, which outline a comprehensive settlement.

2011 Kazan Plan

Named after the city of Kazan, where the Armenian (Sargsyan) and Azerbaijani (Aliyev) presidents met with the Russian president Medvedev, it foresaw:

1) Return of the five regions — Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrayil, Zangelan, and Kubatlu — surrounding NKAO, and under Armenian control, to Azerbaijan

2) Granting of interim status to Karabakh outside of Azerbaijan

3) Deployment of peacekeepers

4) Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;

5) Return of the Kelbajar and Lachin regions to Azerbaijan (except for the Lachin corridor) after the referendum. Prior to the return of the regions to Azerbaijani control, limited Armenian military presence would be allowed in the Kelbajar region until a peace agreement is signed. The location of the Armenian limited military unit would be determined by the International Transitional Commission.

Armenia was ready to sign the document but Azerbaijan rejected the Kazan plan.

Text of the plan.

2015 Lavrov Plan

While he himself refused to even call it a plan, in 2015 Lavrov presented essentially the Kazan with his own modifications to try to win over Azerbaijan. The significant changes were to remove the guarantee of a future referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh's independence, while at the same time inserting the text stating that the peacekeepers would only be Russians.

Sargsyan rejected the plan in October 2016. It was still the only plan on the table when Pashinyan became PM and when it was offered once again to the sides in April 2019, Armenia eventually rejected it again in April 2020.

References

  1. Geukjian, Ohannes (2014). Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace: Opportunities, Obstacles, Prospects. Farnham: Ashgate. pp. 94–96. ISBN 978-1-4724-3515-6. 
  2. 2.0 2.1 "Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries". OSCE. 10 July 2009. http://www.osce.org/mg/51152. Retrieved 6 December 2015.